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Background: The idea that underlying, generative mechanisms give rise to causal regularities has become a
guiding principle across many social and natural science disciplines. A specific form of this enquiry, realist
evaluation is gaining momentum in the evaluation of complex social interventions. It focuses on ‘what works, how,
in which conditions and for whom’ using context, mechanism and outcome configurations as opposed to asking
whether an intervention ‘works’. Realist evaluation can be difficult to codify and requires considerable researcher
reflection and creativity. As such there is often confusion when operationalising the method in practice. This article
aims to clarify and further develop the concept of mechanism in realist evaluation and in doing so aid the learning
of those operationalising the methodology.
Discussion: Using a social science illustration, we argue that disaggregating the concept of mechanism into its
constituent parts helps to understand the difference between the resources offered by the intervention and the
ways in which this changes the reasoning of participants. This in turn helps to distinguish between a context and
mechanism. The notion of mechanisms ‘firing’ in social science research is explored, with discussions surrounding
how this may stifle researchers’ realist thinking. We underline the importance of conceptualising mechanisms as
operating on a continuum, rather than as an ‘on/off’ switch.
Summary: The discussions in this article will hopefully progress and operationalise realist methods. This development
is likely to occur due to the infancy of the methodology and its recent increased profile and use in social science
research. The arguments we present have been tested and are explained throughout the article using a social science
illustration, evidencing their usability and value.
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The idea that enquiry works by uncovering the underlying,
generative mechanisms that give rise to causal regularities
has become a guiding principle across many social and
natural science disciplines. This article aims to provide a
brief description of social mechanisms, mechanisms
within evaluation and then specifically mechanisms in
realist evaluation. The principles of Pawson and Tilley’s
[1] conceptualisation of mechanism will then be discussed
and operationalised through a reconceptualisation of the
Context-Mechanism-Outcome configuration (CMOc) and
an understanding of mechanisms on a continuum of
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Social mechanisms
One of the key tenets of realism is the very basic idea
that observational evidence alone cannot establish causal
uniformities between variables. Rather, it is necessary to
explain why the relationships come about; it is necessary
to establish what goes on in the system that connects its
various inputs and outputs. In this manner, physicists
are able fully to understand the relationship between the
properties of a gas (as measured by the variables—pres-
sure, temperature and volume) using knowledge about
the kinetic action of the constituent molecules. In
pharmacology, the term ‘mechanism of action’ refers to
the specific biochemical interaction through which a
drug substance acts on the body to generate its curative
effect. Programme evaluators do not suppose that CCTV
(the intervention) causes a fall in crime rates (theThis is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public Domain
g/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article,
Dalkin et al. Implementation Science  (2015) 10:49 Page 2 of 7outcome). It does so, when it does so, by persuading
potential perpetrators of increased risks of detection
(the mechanism). In all cases, science delves into the
‘black box’. In all cases, the mechanism is what generates
the observed relationship.
Whilst it is possible to recognise the affinities in ex-
planatory structure across these examples, they also dem-
onstrate that the action of the generative mechanisms is
quite different, to such an extent indeed that that they defy
a simple, unitary definition of their nature and content.
Pawson expands on the applications of generative vs suc-
cessive conceptualisations of causation elsewhere [2].
Readers of this journal will need no reminding that
these paradigms have been debated for many years. Real-
ists see physical and social reality as stratified and emer-
gent. Things that cannot be cast as variables yet are vital
to explanation (like kinetic forces, cultural norms and
human interpretation or agency) are missing from cor-
relational methods. Causal associations themselves are
rarely universal; they are adaptive ‘demi-regularities’,
which are always strongly influenced by setting and con-
text. The original sources for these arguments may be
found in Hesse [3], Harré [4], Pawson [2,5], Sayer [6,7],
Bhaskar [8], Boudon [9] and Stinchcombe [10].
We acknowledge the further cleft between ‘critical real-
ism’ and ‘scientific realism’. The writings of Bhaskar [8,11]
and Pawson [2] serve as a reasonable proxy for these two
schools. They differ on the matter of whether social science
can create ‘closed system’ investigations. For Bhaskar, the
closed system, experimental control available to the natural
scientist is not achievable in social research because of
ever-present emergence, that is to say the unique and
unceasing human capacity to change the circumstances in
which they live. As a ‘substitute’ for closed system empirical
enquiry, he thus proposes the usage of abstract, a priori
reasoning and the admission of a moral lens through which
to critically evaluate human actions ([11], p. 64). Pawson,
by contrast, argues much more pragmatically that neither
physical science nor social science investigation depends on
the achievement of closed systems ([5], p. 67). There are
no crucial experiments (most especially Randomised
Controlled Trials) which alone furnish us with social laws.
But equally, natural science only ever makes slow and im-
perfect progress in gathering knowledge of the potentially
infinite number of contingencies that can shape a physical
system. Investigatory closure is always partial. Again, we
are presented with rather different visions, the only
contradiction occurring when an investigation claims to
be both normative and scientific.
For Archer [12], collective, constrained decision mak-
ing is the underlying mechanism that creates all social
outcomes. Society is made by but never under the con-
trol of human intentions. At any given time, peoples’
choices are conditioned by pre-existing social structuresand organisations. We are thus externally constrained in
our actions but always part of human agency is the
choice to attempt to change the initial conditions that
bear down on us. These adaptive choices, over time, go
on to mould novel structures and changed institutions.
Collectively, our present decisions congregate to form
new systems, which in their own turn, constrain and en-
able the choices of the next generation. Society is thus
patterned and re-patterned by wilful action, but as Archer
reminds us, the causal outcomes never conform to any-
one’s wishes—even the most powerful.
Most realists would affirm this broad account of the
mechanisms of social change, where structures shape ac-
tions, which shape structure, which shape actions, and so
on. There are, however, some significant differences in
where they locate the precise locus of that change. For
Bhaskar [8], causal mechanisms sit primarily within the
structural component of the social world. They reside in
the power and resources that lie with the great institutional
forms of society. For other realists, such as Pawson and
Tilley [1], mechanisms are identified at the level of human
reasoning. Thus, mechanisms can have different meanings
depending on the scope of the intended explanation. Struc-
tural mechanisms come to the fore if the social scientist is
attempting to explain large-scale social transformations. If,
however, the researcher is attempting to discover whether
a particular fitness programme creates healthier partici-
pants, it can be assumed that key outcomes will result from
the reasoning and responses of the participants.
Mechanisms in evaluation
This brings us to a consideration of mechanisms in evalu-
ation research; here the focus is on developing an explan-
ation of how a particular programme works through
changing the reasoning and responses of participants to
bring about a set of intended outcomes. There have been
a number of different conceptualisations of mechanism
within evaluation. Chen and Rossi [13] were among the
first researchers to use the term ‘mechanism’ and highlight
its significance in theory-driven evaluation [14]. In 2005,
Chen [15] broadened our understanding of causal mecha-
nisms by identifying two types: mediating and moderating.
He defines these as follows:
“A mediating causal mechanism is a component of a
program that intervenes in the relationship between two
other components . . . [while] the second type of causal
mechanism—moderating—represents a relationship
between program components that is enabled, or
conditioned, by a third factor.” (pp. 240–241)
Weiss [16] also reflects on mechanisms, in terms of
programme theory. She states that it is important to
understand the difference between implementation
Dalkin et al. Implementation Science  (2015) 10:49 Page 3 of 7theory and programme theory. The earlier can be con-
ceptualised as a logic model, whereas the latter:
“. . . deals with the mechanisms that intervene between
the delivery of program service and the occurrence of
outcomes of interest. It focuses on participants’
responses to program service. The mechanism of
change is not the program service per se but the
response that the activities generate.” (p. 46)
As Weiss [16] states, mechanisms are not the
programme service but the response it triggers from stake-
holders and resulting outcome. For example, Vassilev
et al.’s [17] metasynthesis investigated how social networks
can make a considerable contribution to improving health
outcomes for people with long-term conditions (specific-
ally, type 2 diabetes). They identified three themes which
translated into three ‘network mechanisms’: network navi-
gation (identifying and connecting with relevant existing
resources in a network), negotiation within networks
(re-shaping relationships, roles, expectations, means of
engagement and communication between network
members) and collective efficacy (developing a shared
perception and capacity to successfully perform behav-
iour through shared effort, beliefs, influence, persever-
ance, and objectives). The authors highlight not only
resources in these mechanisms but also reasoning;
these mechanisms convey the close interdependence
between social and psychological processes in long-term
conditions management. Furthermore, these network
mechanisms are subject to context, as the authors state:
“they are shaped by the environments in which they
take place which can be enabling or disabling
depending on the capacities they offer for carrying out
illness management work and supporting behaviours
beneficial for people’s health.” (p. 10)
Despite the many different conceptualisations, e.g.
[9,13-16,18], and applications of mechanisms, e.g.
[17,19,20], most in some way have been influenced by
the critical realism and scientific realism accounts of
causation, e.g. [1,21,22], discussed above. In these
schools of thought, mechanisms are usually hidden, sensi-
tive to variations in context and generate outcomes. As
Astbury and Leeuw [14] state, mechanisms in realism are:
“underlying entities, processes, or structures which
operate in particular contexts to generate outcomes of
interest.” (p. 368)
We survey this broader terrain as a prelude to focus-
sing on the more specific version of mechanism thinking
referred to by Pawson and Tilley that has come to play akey role in the evaluation of social interventions, namely
realist evaluation [1], which is the main focus of this
article.
Mechanisms in realist evaluation
Within the scientific realism approach, Pawson and Tilley
[1] have provided their own conceptualisation of mecha-
nisms; mechanisms are a combination of resources offered
by the social programme under study and stakeholders’
reasoning in response [1]. They state that mechanisms will
only activate in the right conditions, providing a context +
mechanism = outcome formula as a guiding principle to
realist enquiry [1]. This article sits within the empirical ap-
plication of realism in the form of realist evaluation and
the usage of mechanisms therein. In particular, we make a
case for the explicit disaggregation of resources and rea-
soning in implementation endeavours, to which task we
now turn.
The units of analysis within realist evaluation are
programme theories—the ideas and assumptions under-
lying how, why and in what circumstances complex so-
cial interventions work. Many readers will by now be
very familiar with programme theories expressed as
CMOc and with the fact that data collection and analysis
in realist evaluation centres on the process of develop-
ing, testing and refining CMOc. In the next section of
the paper, we propose a development of this formula,
which aims to facilitate the study of implementation
processes and interventions.
A social science illustrative case study
In order to illustrate our argument in this article and
maximise explanatory reach, we draw on empirical data
from our realist evaluation of a palliative care Integrated
Care Pathway (ICP). The ICP aimed to improve the co-
ordination of care for people in the final year of life by
identifying individuals approaching end-of-life, assessing
and agreeing how needs and preferences of patients
could be met, providing support for families and carers
and using Advance Care Planning (ACP) to manage the
patients’ final illness in order to achieve a ‘good’ (prefer-
ence based) death. The ICP comprised a variety of inter-
ventions including palliative care registrations, ACP and
multidisciplinary team meetings in order to anticipate
and plan care for patients with palliative care needs. We
evaluated the implementation of the ICP across 14 GP
practices in one UK locality using realist evaluation. Five
initial programme theories, generated from immersion in
the field and literature on ICPs, were tested: (1) the embed-
dedness of the ICP into GP practices, (2) the registration of
palliative care patients, (3) preference discussions and ACP,
(4) facilitating difficult conversations and (5) facilitating
home deaths. The five refined programme theories were
combined to create one overall programme theory of the
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tool of national policy drivers (such as shared decision
making, patient-centred care and proactive care) into local
practice.
Using realist evaluation to shed light on how such a
complex intervention could work in practice made intui-
tive sense but proved not to be without operational chal-
lenges. These have been echoed by other realist researchers
[23-25] and have prompted the writing of this paper.
This paper has two main aims:
– To make a case for the explicit disaggregation of
resources and reasoning within mechanisms;
– To reiterate the need for nuance in considering
whether mechanisms fire in a dual on/off mode.Figure 1 A CMOc framework.Discussion
Disaggregating mechanisms into resources and reasoning
1 The concern
Realists posit that exposing not only the mechanisms of
change in an intervention but more importantly their
relationship to the context of their implementation is
key to the evaluation of complex programmes [20,26].
However, deciding whether aspects within an interven-
tion implementation process in a realist project con-
tribute contextually or mechanistically to the overall
explanatory endeavour has become the realist re-
searcher’s quandary [14,23,27]. Like these authors, we
encountered challenges in distinguishing between con-
text and mechanism in our evaluation of the ICP and
were cognisant of the need not to conflate programme
strategy (the intervention) with mechanism. We concur
with Jagosh et al. [23], who note how it is not always as
straightforward as might be assumed to map the com-
plexities of the transformation process and the multiple
systems within which it operates onto the C +M =O
formula. Arguably, outcomes can be identified with
most ease; they are observed or measured or at least
aimed at with a degree of clarity. Although the distinction
between resources and reasoning is used in Pawson and
Tilley’s seminal work [1], their relative importance in un-
derstanding mechanisms is often understated. Conse-
quently, researchers often emphasise one at the expense of
the other, under the banner of mechanism [25]. To ad-
dress this, we offer the solution below.
2 Our way forward
Building on the original work of Pawson and Tilley [1],
we would like to propose an alternative operationalisa-
tion of the CMOc formula:
Intervention resources are introduced in a context, in
a way that enhances a change in reasoning. This alters
the behaviour of participants, which leads to outcomes.The revised formula therefore reads:
MðResourcesÞþC→MðReasoningÞ ¼O
Resources and reasoning are mutually constitutive of a
mechanism, but explicitly disaggregating them can help
operationalise the difference between a mechanism and a
context. Although resource and reasoning are made expli-
cit in the seminal work of Pawson and Tilley [1], they have
often not been referred to explicitly in subsequent re-
search. In our own study, through using this formula, it
became clearer whether data contributed contextually or
mechanistically, as we could identify mechanism compo-
nents (resource and reasoning) which are different to con-
texts. Figure 1 illustrates how we have presented the new
formula diagrammatically in the ICP study. Through trial
and error, it became clear that the original formula could
be built upon, hence the new formula which disaggregates
resource and reasoning, placing ‘context’ in between.
However, this is not to be confused with just using re-
sources without reasoning—they must always come as a
pair. It is important to note here that this new formula is
only an extension of the original heuristic developed by
Pawson and Tilley [1]. This new formula does not aim
to re-draw the full sequence of causation but to modify
the basic heuristic to aid operationalisation of realist
approaches.
Differentiating between resource (the component in-
troduced in a context) and reasoning therefore helps
distinguish between relevant context and mechanism.
Identifying the resource is contingent on the purpose
of the study, and identifying the reasoning avoids the
issue of conflating programme strategy (resource) with
mechanism.
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In the palliative care ICP study, an outcome pattern was
observed that practices identified and placed fewer pallia-
tive patients with non-cancer illnesses on their palliative
care registers, in comparison to those with cancer illnesses.
This was common across all 14 practices studied and was
particularly noticeable for patients residing in care homes,
where many older adults have non-cancer illnesses. Pa-
tients with non-cancer illnesses have unpredictable illness
trajectories, meaning that registering this patient group
is challenging for health care professionals, as a period
of significant decline can be followed by substantial im-
provement, despite a downward trend in wellness [28,29].
Comparatively, this is not the case with cancer diagnoses
as often there is a specific diagnosis and steady illness tra-
jectory. We aimed to generate a CMOc to explain why
there were less palliative care registrations of patients with
non-cancer illnesses than cancer patients (outcome). In
attempting to formulate the configuration, we were
uncertain whether the context was the unpredictable
illness trajectories of older adults without a cancer
diagnosis, or care homes in general or the palliative
care register being difficult to use with non-cancer pa-
tients. Breaking down the C +M =O formula to include
resource and reasoning using the new formula, M (re-
source) + C→M (reasoning) = O, helped in deciphering
the context from the mechanism. The use of the new
formula diagram (Figure 2) also helped in configuring
the whole CMOc. Figure 2 displays the novel way in
which the new formula should be represented diagram-
matically. Through using the new formula and associated
diagram, it became clear that the resource was the pallia-
tive care register which, when used with older adults who
had unpredictable illness trajectories (context), resulted in
anxiety in registering these patients (reasoning), whichFigure 2 Refined CMOc for patients in care homes receiving the ICP.meant that less older patients in care homes were regis-
tered (outcome) (Figure 2). Through understanding that
resources were introduced into pre-existing contexts in
a way that altered the participants’ reasoning, it becomes
easier to explain the differential registration numbers
(outcome).
Disaggregating resources and reasoning encourages re-
searchers to consider both concepts, rather than privileging
one at the expense of the other and will contribute signifi-
cantly to the explanatory endeavour of the realist re-
searcher. It is important to understand the new formula (M
(Resource) + C→M (Reasoning) =O) highlights that re-
sources must be introduced into a pre-existing context,
which in collaboration induces an individual’s reasoning,
leading to an outcome. Distinguishing the resources that
are introduced into contexts from the reasoning this gener-
ates can provide both an operational and a conceptual clari-
fication of mechanism. It can enable researchers to clearly
understand the role of context in triggering mechanisms,
thus developing their explanation of how interventions
work. We now turn to interrogate the notion of mecha-
nisms being ‘triggered’ in the next section of the paper.
A case for continuums of activation in reasoning
1 The concern
A separate but related difficulty encountered when using
mechanisms in social science research is the notion that
mechanisms are often said to ‘fire’, ‘trigger’ or ‘modify’ in
context to create an outcome [1,30-32]. Pawson and Tilley
[1] use the much referenced gun powder analogy to explain
this. When a spark is introduced to gun powder, the chem-
ical composition of gun powder (mechanism) results in an
explosion (outcome). However, there are no explosions if
the context is not right—damp conditions, insufficient
powder, not adequately compact, no oxygen present, dur-
ation of heat applied is too short (context). Thus it purports
that causal outcomes follow from mechanisms acting in
contexts; this is the base from which all realist explanation
builds. Most complex social interventions involve stake-
holders’ volition (reasoning). As Pawson [33] states, “much
more than in any other type of social programme, interper-
sonal relationships between stakeholders embody the inter-
vention” [33]. We found it difficult to apply the firing
analogy to interventions where human volition is entwined
in the intervention. Reasoning in these cases is rarely
activated via an on/off switch, triggered in favourable
contextual conditions. Instead, activation operates along a
continuum similar to the light created by a ‘dimmer
switch’, where intensity varies in line with an ever evolving
context. Our experience suggests that researchers are often
enabled to develop their realist thinking further when this
myth of on/off reasoning is dispelled. The metaphor of the
dimmer switch accommodates the activation of new vol-
ition as well as the idea of continuums of activation.
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Conceptualising volition as happening in a binary ‘firing’/
‘not firing’ fashion masks a continuum of activation which
can have more explanatory value in understanding how
interventions work. There are varying degrees to which an
individual can feel confident, angry or mistrustful, leading
in turn to a gradation of outcomes.
3 The social science illustration
In our evaluation of the ICP, we observed that the volition
of health care professionals was always on a continuum.
Health care professionals felt anxious when registering
older adults with an illness other than cancer, as the tra-
jectory of such illnesses is so unpredictable (Figure 2).
Health care professionals could not predict patients’ de-
cline, did not wish to over populate their palliative care
registers and were worried about registering patients who
seemed relatively well but could decline quickly. Further-
more, once a decline in health begins in older adults with
non-cancer illnesses, it can be very rapid and thus end-of-
life care is implemented quickly and is often unplanned,
which can result in a death that does not adhere to patient
preferences. The anxiety of health care professionals work-
ing with palliative non-cancer patients was evident, yet
this anxiety did not switch on and off, it developed over
time, as patients’ illnesses progressed. It also differed
between health care professionals; those with more experi-
ence of working with patients with non-cancer disease
had less anxiety about registering them. Thus the reason-
ing of having anxiety was on a continuum for health care
professionals using the palliative care register. There is a
variation in the amount of anxiety a health care profes-
sional will feel when registering a patient with a non-
cancer illness, it is not dichotomised; the degree to which
this is felt is combined with a facilitative context and ap-
propriate resource. This should lead to a more appropriate
use of the palliative care register.
Summary
This paper aimed to help the operationalisation of the C +
M=O formula, through (1) a disaggregation of the mech-
anism resource and mechanism reasoning and (2) a con-
ceptualisation of activation continuums, rather than a
binary trigger. The solutions proposed in this article will
enable a clearer application of realist evaluation to under-
standing how complex interventions are implemented.
We have already found some evidence to support this
argument by applying it in our own teaching and work-
shops. For example, the ‘workability’ of this framework
has been tested with researchers at the beginning of
their realist journey in a realist summer school at the
Centre for Advancement in Realist Evaluation and Synthe-
sis (CARES), University of Liverpool. Course participants
found it useful to guide their realist learning, understandthe method further and clarify the differences between
mechanism and context, and resources and reasoning.
We hope that this article furthers the discussions on the
operationalisation of realist theory development in a way
that, in particular, helps novice realist researchers to em-
brace and in turn develop the methodology. The authors
would welcome testing of the methodological refinements
discussed throughout this article by other researchers
across a wide range of fields, with such testing aiding fur-
ther developments.
Abbreviation
CMOc: Context Mechanism Outcome configuration.
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